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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Jaryn Watt entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2) 
on July 30, 2013 to Paraphernalia a violation of Idaho Code 37-2734A(l) and Possession of a 
Controlled Substance a violation of Idaho Code 37-2732(c)(3). Mr. Watt filed his Notice of 
Appeal on August 2, 2013; the District Court heard argument and took the matter under 
advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order affirming the denial 
of suppression on January 16, 2014, and Mr. Watt now timely appeals. 
On appeal, Mr. Watt asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his Motion to 
Suppress based on the lack of reasonable articulable suspicion to prolong the detention in 
violation of Mr. Watt's 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment Rights of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 13 and 17 of the Idaho State Constitution. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On February 12, 2013 at about 10:15 p.m. Jaryn Watt was at the intersection of Eagle 
Road and Easy Jet near the dumpster located in the parking lot of several businesses. (06/13/13 
Hr., p.4, Ls.22-24)(06/13/13 Hr., p.5, Ls.8-23). Jaryn was stopped near the dumpster to throw 
away some trash that was in his vehicle. (06/13/13 Hr., p.28, Ls.1-8). The doors of his vehicle 
were open and the lights inside the vehicle were on. (06/13/13 Hr., p.28, Ls.1-8). Jaryn had 
thrown some trash away, and gone back to his vehicle when he saw an empty can of chewing 
tobacco. (06/13/13 Hr., p.28, Ls.1-8). Jaryn tossed the can of chewing tobacco over the 
enclosure, and it bounced off the top so he went around the side of the enclosure to pick up the 
can and put it in the dumpster. (06/13/13 Hr., p.28, Ls.16-p.29, Ls.4). Once Jaryn came out of 
the dumpster enclosure for the second time, he saw the police car pull in behind him. (06/13/13 
Hr., p.29, Ls.1-4). 
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Officer Clark testified that he did not activate his emergency lights. (6/13/13 Hr., p.7, 
Ls.11-12). However, Jaryn testified that he observed the flashing lights of the police car as well 
as a spotlight on him specifically. (06/13/13 Hr., p.29, Ls.21-25). Officer Clark testified that he 
was just kind of curious as to why Jaryn was there, and thought that it was odd. (06/13/13 Hr., 
p.6, L. 25 - p. 7 Ls. 3). As Officer Clark spoke with Jaryn he alleges that his pupil's didn't react 
much to light and that his eyes were bloodshot and watery. (06/13/13 Hr., p.8, Ls.16-21). 
Officer Clark had Jaryn's driver's license and returned to his vehicle to check for wants and 
warrants. (06/13/13 Hr., p.9, Ls.7-15). While in his patrol vehicle Officer Clark called Deputy 
Tenna for an assist. (06/13/13 Hr., p.9, Ls.11-15). Deputy Tenna is a K9 handler and based on 
Officer Clarks' observations, he believed Jaryn was under the influence of a controlled 
substance. (06/13/13 Hr., p.11, Ls.2-8). Officer Clark conducted further investigation including 
measuring his pupils, a modified Rhomberg Stand test, and took his pulse. (06/13/13 Hr., p.11, 
Ls.13 -p.14 L.3). None of those tests are standard field sobriety tests and Jaryn believes those 
tests were irrelevant to the initial determination as to whether or not Officer Clark had reasonable 
and articulable suspicion to prolong the detention. (06/13/13 Hr., p. 9, Ls.18 - p.10 Ls.23 ). From 
the time Officer Clark made contact with Jaryn, until Deputy Tenna arrived was about seven 
minutes. (06/13/13 Hr., p.14, L. 10). 
Officer Clark did not ask any questions about Jaryn's day, whether he had been working 
a full day or sleeping. (06/13/13 Hr., p.19, Ls.3-22). Officer Clark had never met Jaryn, and had 
no knowledge as to how Jaryn's eyes normally appear. (06/13/13 Hr., p.20, Ls.1-3). Officer 
Clark is not an ophthalmologist, and when evaluating pupil size, it is measured in millimeters, 
which is one of the smallest forms of measurement. (06/13/13 Hr., p.20, Ls.4-14). Officer Clark 
has only a "few" hours training in evaluating pupil size. (06/13/13 Hr., p.21, Ls.12-20). 
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J aryn did not get his license back from Officer Clark until after he had been detained and 
placed in the back of the police car, and then released with a citation. (06/13/13 Hr., p.37, Ls.15-
19). 
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ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err when it failed to grant the defendant's Motion to Suppress 
based on the lack of reasonable articulable suspicion to prolong the detention in 
violation of Mr. Watt's 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment Rights of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 13 and 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Grant The Defendant's Motion to Suppress Based On 
The Lack Of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion To Prolong The Detention In Violation Of Mr. 
Watt's 4th, 5th. and 6th Amendment Rights Of The United States Constitution And Article I, 
Sections 13 And 17 Of The Idaho State Constitution? 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Watt asserts that based on the totality of the circumstances; the officer unreasonably 
extended the detention of Mr. Watt after the purpose of the encounter had been abandoned and 
that the trial court erred when it failed to grant his Motion to Suppress because Officer Carter 
lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to prolong the detention in violation of Mr. Watt's 
constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed to him by the United 
States and Idaho Constitutions. 
B. Standard on Appeal 
Motions to suppress evidence for violation of constitutional rights present questions of 
fact and law. This Court exercise free review in determining whether constitutional standards 
have been met in light of the facts presented. State v. Holler, 136 Idaho 287,291, 32 P.3d 679, 
683 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Evans, 134 Idaho 560, 563, 6 P.3d 416, 419 (Ct.App.2000); State v. 
Jordan, 122 Idaho 771,772,839 P.2d 38, 39 (Ct.App.1992). 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Grant The Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Based On The Lack Of Reasonable Articulable Suspicion To Prolong The Detention In 
Violation Of Mr. Watt's 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment Rights of The United States 
Constitution And Article I, Sections 13 And 17 Of The Idaho State Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution guarantee the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
conducted by governrnent officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const Art. I, § 17. The federal 
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safeguard has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution to apply to the states. State v. Bishop, l 46 Idaho 804, 810, 203 
P.3d 1203 (2009) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (1961)). "Evidence obtained in 
violation of the amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the 
illegal government action." Id. at 810-11. This "exclusionary rule" applies to both "evidence 
obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the 
exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 811. "The test is 
'whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant 
objection is made has been come at by exploitation of [the original] illegality or instead by 
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint."' Id. ( quoting Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471,488 (1963) (alteration in original)). In other words, "evidence that is 
sufficiently attenuated from the illegal government action may be admitted at trial." Id. "When a 
defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, the government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in 
question was reasonable." Id. 
"A traffic stop is subject to the Fourth Amendment restraint against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220 (Ct.App.2003). A 
routine traffic stop, typically of limited scope and duration, is analyzed under the principles set 
forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because it is more analogous to an investigative 
detention than a custodial arrest. Id. "Under Terry, an investigative detention is permissible if it 
is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has 
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." Id. Under this standard, the "totality of the 
circumstances then known to the officer ... must show a particularized and objective basis for 
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suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
"To meet the constitutional standard of reasonableness, an investigative detention must 
not only be justified by reasonable suspicion at its inception, but also must be reasonably related 
in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." Id. A traffic violation, as 
an unlawful activity, in itself justifies a traffic stop. State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 
P.2d 641 (1998). 
As stated m Terry the determination of whether investigative detention is reasonable 
requires a two-pronged analysis: (1) "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception" 
and (2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place." When a person is detained, the scope of the detention must be 
carefully tailored to its underlying justification and must last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500 (1983). Further, it is the 
State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable 
suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an 
investigative seizure. Id. at 500-501. A routine traffic stop is a limited seizure that closely 
resembles an investigative detention under Terry. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
However, Terry prohibits an expansion of a traffic stop to a drug investigation if police 
immediately abandon the purpose that justified the stop. 
Idaho's Constitution stands on its own, and although we may look to the rulings of the 
federal courts on the United States Constitution for guidance in interpreting our own state 
constitutional guarantees, "we interpret a separate and in many respects, independent 
constitution." Hellar v. Cenarrusa, l 06 Idaho 586, 590, 682 P.2d 539, 543 (1984). Idaho's 
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Constitution, specifically Article I, § 17 provides more privacy protection as well as more 
remedial protection including suppression. Idaho's exclusionary rule was applied in State v. 
Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), 34 years before the federal exclusionary rule was 
applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Thus, Idaho has a long history of 
recognizing both the efficacy and importance of the exclusionary rule. In State v. Rauch, 99 
Idaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978), the Court recognized that to admit illegally seized evidence 
would constitute an independent constitutional violation by the court in addition to the violation 
at the time of the illegal search. 
Idaho's Court has recognized that the more substantial cost to society is the violation of 
the constitutional rights, not that a guilty party may go free. 
"I can see no such expediency or necessity for the enforcement of any law as to 
justify violation of constitutional rights to accomplish it. The shock to the 
sensibilities of the average citizen when his government violates a constitutional 
right of another is far more evil in its effect than the escape of any criminal 
through the courts' observance of those rights." Arregui, 44 Idaho at _, 254 P. 
at 792. 
Although the Federal Exclusionary rule has been whittled away at through case law, Idaho's 
Constitution and the Exclusionary Rule are still in full force and effect. Idahoans are more 
protective of their privacy, thus the Courts should provide us with more protection. We are more 
concerned about the innocent being affected by overzealous police, "The prospect of unregulated 
governmental monitoring will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to those with nothing illicit to 
hide." State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 751, 760 P.2d 1162 (1988). 
In State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct.App.2005), a deputy assisting in a 
traffic stop noticed a truck driven by Mr. Aguirre circling the area. Id. at 561. Mr. Aguirre was 
subsequently observed pulling out of a parking lot without coming to a complete stop prior to 
entering the roadway. Id. After a traffic stop was effectuated, the deputy made contact with Mr. 
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Aguirre, inquired as to why he was circling the area, received Mr. Aguirre's driver's license, 
registration and insurance, and requested permission to search the vehicle. Id. at 561-562. Mr. 
Aguirre refused and the deputy then advised him that he would deploy a drug detection dog 
around the truck. Id. The dog alerted on the outside of the truck and a subsequent search 
revealed a semi-automatic handgun. Id. 
The Court was presented with the question of whether the use of the drug dog was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the traffic stop. In its analysis 
the Court noted that in previous cases in which the use of a drug dog has been permitted, it did 
not extend the duration of the stop beyond that which was necessary to address the traffic 
violation. Id. at 563. In contrast, the facts with which the Court was presented indicated that law 
enforcement officers made no further effort to pursue the initial purpose of the stop ( the traffic 
violation of not coming to a complete stop) and made no effort to delegate responsibility for 
concurrent investigations. Id. at 564. The Court further noted that" ... the collective effort of the 
police was uniformly directed at a drug investigation completely unrelated to the traffic stop. 
The purpose that justified the stop - the issuance of a traffic citation was immediately 
abandoned." Id. Though the entire stop lasted only five to seven minutes, the court held that, 
because the dog sniff was not reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
traffic stop, and no further probable cause justified the extension, the sniff was an 
unconstitutional expansion of the traffic stop. Id. at 850, 852. 
Further, Idaho courts have held even a minimal extension may be unconstitutional where 
no additional grounds for doing so are discovered before the initial justification for the stop is 
resolved. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 51 P.3d 461, 466 (Ct.App.2002). In Gutierrez, a 
passenger was cited for possession of a controlled substance, after a consensual search of the 
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vehicle. Id. at 463. After pulling the car over for speeding, the officer noticed the driver 
exhibited "undue nervousness." Id. The officer ensured the driver's license was valid, and 
returned to the car to issue the driver a warning. Rather than concluding the stop, the officer 
began asking the driver if illegal items were in the car. The officer noted that the driver's body 
language suggested he was lying. The officer obtained consent to search the vehicle and 
subsequently discovered marijuana. Id. The court held that, although the stop was extended for 
only "sixty to ninety seconds," it was an impermissible extension because the officer did not 
have "reasonable, objective grounds for doing so." Id. at 466. 
In this case, Officer Clark made contact with Mr. Watt because he "was just kind of 
curious" and after an explanation of a legitimate purpose for being near the dumpster and in this 
parking lot the officer claimed Jaryn had dilated pupils and bloodshot and watery eyes. It wasn't 
until at least five (5) minutes later that Deputy Tenna arrived with the drug detection dog. 
Unlike Guiterrez, there was no observation of any undue nervousness or body language that 
would suggest the driver was lying or that potential criminal activity was afoot. Officer Clark 
did not observe any odor of alcohol or marijuana, and the only potential indicator was bloodshot 
and watery eyes. Further, there is no evidence that Mr. Watt exhibited any symptoms of 
impairment or that he was on probation or parole or involved in any other criminal activity. 
There were no reasonable or objective grounds for Officer Clark to ask for the assistance of a 
drug detection dog or for the officer to then question Mr. Watt regarding the presence of 
anything illegal or to pursue any further testing. 
Officer Clark immediately directed his efforts toward a drug/DUI investigation 
completely unrelated to the initial consensual encounter. The consensual encounter ended once 
Officer Clark took the license of Mr. Watt to check for wants and warrants. Because drivers are 
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required to carry their licenses on them at all times, a driver is seized when a cop takes the 
license. State v. Osborn, 121 Idaho 520, 826 P.2d 481 (Ct.App. 1991). There was nothing to 
suggest to the officer that criminal activity was afoot and instead of concluding the encounter, 
the officer had the individual wait an additional five minutes for the drug detection dog and then 
asked questions with respect to illegal drugs. 
The initial consensual encounter was transformed into a detention when Officer Clark 
took the driver's license of Mr. Watt; that detention was unreasonably lengthened when Officer 
Clark began testing Mr. Watt with regards to a potential DUI investigation. What is specifically 
telling is that instead of having Mr. Watt perform the standard field sobriety tests (horizontal 
gaze nystagmus, walk and turn, one leg stand) which are performed in almost all DUI 
investigations Officer Clark instead performed his own tests in an apparent stall and delay tactic 
to ensure the arrival of the K9. The three "tests" used by Officer Clark are not part of the 
standard field sobriety testing. Further, two of the offered "tests" were not tests and were the 
subjective measuring of a pupil and a pulse. Officer Clark violated the Fourth Amendment rights 
of Mr. Watt; like in Aguirre and Guiterrez, because Officer Clark lacked reasonable objective 
grounds for extending the stop, the evidence must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Watt respectfully requests that this court reverse the 
trial court's decision denying his Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 17th day of June 2014. 
,~-----
HEIDI TdLMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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